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Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservation of
an Emerging Consensus
James A. Henderson, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
No other subject in the field of products liability exceeds defec-
tive product design for having produced disagreement and confusion
among courts and commentators over the past decade. It is, therefore,
ironic that on the eve of what could fairly be described as the achieve-
ment of a general consensus regarding the appropriate conceptual
basis for determining liability for defective design, three potentially
influential courts have threatened to thrust that issue once again into
controversy. Within the year just past, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,' the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 2 and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Schuldies v.
Service Machinery Co.,3 have rendered decisions in product design
cases which, if read literally and taken seriously, could postpone the
achievement of consensus indefinitely. This Article examines these
decisions critically, demonstrating that they are substantially in
error. It is offered in the hope of reducing the threat to consensus
posed by these decisions and helping to preserve a lasting peace re-
garding the appropriate conceptual basis of liability for defective
product design.
II. THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
Much of the confusion traditionally surrounding the issue of
defective product design may be traced to the inherent differences
between cases involving manufacturing flaws and cases involving
faulty design, and the inadequacy of the concept of "defect" as a
guide to decision in the latter category.' In a flaw case, the manufac-
turer's intended design provides a built-in standard against which to
measure the adequacy of an individual product. A flawed product
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
1. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
2. 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
3. 448 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
4. These differences have been chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g., Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1531 (1973); Keeton, Manufacturers' Liability: The
Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv.
559 (1969).
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departs dangerously from the great majority of products manufac-
tured according to identical design specifications; the inquiry into
whether or not a product is flawed is essentially mechanicalP In a
design case, in contrast, no built-in standard is available. By defini-
tion, the plaintiff in such a case is attacking the adequacy of the
design itself; the inquiry focuses on the value choices implicit in the
manufacturer's design specifications. Thus, in a case involving an
allegedly defective product design, the court must bring to bear a
standard of judgment external to the product itself. In answering the
question "How much design safety is adequate?", the court must
develop, or adopt from some legitimate extrajudicial source, an objec-
tive standard of adequacy.'
Given the open-ended nature of the judgmental task presented
in design cases, it is not surprising that courts and commentators
have disagreed over the appropriate conceptual basis for determining
defective product design.' In recent years, however, a consensus has
gradually developed regarding the appropriate conceptual basis of
liability in these cases. Consistent with section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts,' the issue of defective product design is to be
5. For an archetypical illustration of the manufacturing flaw case see Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (brake
failure). See generally Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Prod-
ucts Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 103-07 (1977).
The inquiry, of course, amounts to something more than mere determination that
one product unit has an imperfection that makes it different from the other units.
Philosophically, it is necessary to rely on some principle of reasonableness to determine
whether a particular mechanical imperfection is serious enough to warrant labeling the
product "flawed." As a practical matter, however, most flaw cases involve imperfec-
tions serious enough to cause the product to fail in use, causing harm. In the typical
cases in which flaws do not cause product failure, courts encounter analytical difficul-
ties similar to those in design cases. See, e.g., Tenney v. Seven-Up Co., 92 N.M. 158,
584 P.2d 205 (1978) (denying recovery for anxiety and stomach upset allegedly caused
by an admittedly harmless foreign substance in a bottled soft drink).
6. See generally Phillips, supra note 5, at 103-05.
7. See generally Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a
Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 109, 109-12 (1976); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides,
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applied although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
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resolved by means of cost-benefit analysis, with the injured plaintiff
bearing the burden of persuading the tribunal9 that the costs asso-
ciated with the defendant's design choices, including accident costs,
exceeded the benefits of the design.' 0 In essence, cost-benefit analysis
in this context is based on the premise that the marginal increases
in accident costs generated by a manufacturer's having chosen its
product design over safer alternatives are unacceptable only if it can
be demonstrated that they exceed the marginal benefits to be gained
by having such relatively riskier product designs available to the
public." Some products, such as knives, are necessarily designed in
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965) ("The burden
of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands
of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff.").
10. Many courts have taken this approach. See, e.g., Union Supply Co. v. Pust,
583 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1978); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa
1978); Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods, 576 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.
2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 246 S.E.2d 176
(S.C. 1978); Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978). But see
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (test for defective design
is what consumers actually expect in the way of performance, and not what they
reasonably should expect); Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337
A.2d 893 (1975) (instructing the jury in terms of the reasonableness of manufacturer's
design choices is improper because it undermines the principle that the manufacturer
is effectively a guarantor of its product's safety).
Similarly, a number of commentators have supported use of the cost-benefit anal-
ysis. See, e.g., Dickerson, Product Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Epstein, Product Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground,
56 N.C. L. REv. 643 (1978); Hoenig, supra note 7; Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973); Phillips, supra note 5; Wade, supra
note 7; Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REv. 425 (1974); Comment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 633
(1976); Comment, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 25 (1975). But see Hubbard, Reasonable Human
Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products,
29 MERCER L. REV. 465 (1978) (notions of efficiency should play "residual role" in
deference to actual human expectations); Comment, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 189 (1974)
("unreasonably dangerous" properly excluded from definition of "defect" because in-
compatible with strict liability).
11. "Marginal" cost-benefit analysis focuses on the increases and decreases in
costs and benefits incurred when one product design is replaced with another. If an
injured plaintiff can show that the additional benefits (in the form of reduced accident
costs) to be derived from the adoption of a safer design would outweigh the additional
costs (in the form of production costs and decreased product utility) generated by the
adoption of such an alternative, the plaintiff will have succeeded in demonstrating that
the defendant's design choices were unreasonably dangerous. So long as a safer design
alternative is thus available at acceptable levels of marginal cost, it is to be preferred,
even if the total benefits of the design chosen by the defendant exceed its total cost,
1979]
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such a way as to make them both risky and beneficial. As long as the
benefits outweigh the risks, the product's design is not legally defec-
tive simply because it is risky. 2 According to the emerging consensus,
it is necessary to assess the relative costs and benefits of both the
defendant's design and safer alternatives in order to determine
whether a given product design is unreasonably risky and therefore
legally defective.
Perhaps the most influential treatment of the cost-benefit analy-
sis in product design cases has been offered by Professor John W.
Wade. In a much cited article, 3 Professor Wade developed seven
factors that should be considered in determining whether the plaintiff
has carried his burden of proof. Included among these factors are the
utility of the product to its user and to the public as a whole, the
likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the
injury, and the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe charac-
ter of the products without impairing its utility or making it too
including accident costs. Thus, cost-benefit analysis in the present context is con-
cerned with comparative, rather than total, costs and benefits.
For several different formulations of the basic cost-benefit approach, see Hubbard,
Efficiency, Expectation and Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Concept of
Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C. L. Rav. 587, 604 & n.55, 605 (1977).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS § 402A, Comments i & k (1965):
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only
where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely
safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk
of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison
to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of
torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this
Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment
of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging conse-
quences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous. . . . The seller of such products . . . is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
13. See Wade, supra note 7.
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expensive. 4 Some commentators have suggested shorter, simpler
lists; 5 others have eschewed list-making altogether and have opted
for a "reasonableness under the circumstances" test. Although there
is considerable variation in how commentators describe what they are
espousing, there is a basic consensus among them that liability in
design cases is to be determined by a balancing of benefits and risks,
with the plaintiff bearing the burden of demonstrating unreasonable
risk.
Admittedly, some disagreement persists over whether negligence
or strict liability should constitute the primary doctrinal basis for
liability. 7 Under a negligence approach, the focus is on the reasona-
bleness of the defendant manufacturer's conduct in choosing among
available design alternatives. Under a strict liability approach, the
focus is on the reasonableness of the design itself.'9 Since the design
ultimately adopted reflects the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
choices in adopting it, however, the basic cost-benefit analysis under-
taken in assessing liability will be substantially the same under either
strict liability or negligence. 0 Professor Wade, who has suggested
that, on balance, strict liability is preferable, has noted the possibil-
ity that the two theories might produce different outcomes in at least
one type of case: that in which the defendant can show that in the
exercise of reasonable care he could not have known of the attendant
risks at the time the relevant design choices were made.2' In such a
case, the defendant would be liable under a theory of strict liability
but not under a negligence theory. Despite this difference, however,
Professor Wade acknowledges that the basic cost-benefit analysis
under both negligence and strict liability is substantially identical in
product design cases."
This is not to say that the persistent confusion over strict
14. Id. at 837-38.
15. For example, in § 104(B) of its recently promulgated Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law, the Department of Commerce proposes five factors to be considered in
determining the defectiveness of product designs. 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2998 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert
in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303, 1307 (1974).
17. Compare Hoenig, supra note 7, at 123-24, 136-37 (negligence) with Wade,
supra note 5, at 826-27 (strict liability).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToaTS § 398 (1965) ("failure to exercise reason-
able care in the adoption of a safe plan or design").
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965) ("any product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer").
20. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033,
1039 (1974).
21. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-16, 25
(1965). See also Phillips, supra note 5, at 116.
22. See Wade, supra note 5, at 841.
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liability and negligence has had no ill effect on the development of a
unified approach to product design cases. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.,21 decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1972, is one
judicial decision in the recent period of growing consensus that, to-
gether with its progeny,2 has done more than any other to foster
lingering doubts regarding the appropriateness of the cost-benefit
approach in design cases. In Cronin, the court unanimously held that
under the strict liability theory set out in the leading California case
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,25 a products liability
plaintiff is not required to prove that a product was, in the words of
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts,26 "unreasonably
dangerous" at the time of sale by the defendant. Instead, an injured
plaintiff would merely be required to prove that the product in ques-
tion was "defective" at the time of sale, and that the defective condi-
tion caused injury to the plaintiff. The court appears to have been
obsessed with the idea of purging "an element which rings of negli-
gence" from strict products liability.Y
The Cronin case involved a manufacturing flaw: a weak metal
hasp in a bread truck had broken while in use, causing plaintiff's
injuries.2 Elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" element in
flaw cases did little harm to the general accord of courts and com-
mentators in that area. As explained above, the test for a defect in
such cases is a rather mechanical comparison between an individual
product unit and the rest of the product line, rather than a cost-
benefit analysis.29 In those cases in which the plaintiff cannot prove
that the flaw in question was dangerous enough to have resulted in
injury, he will have failed to meet his burden of proof of causation.
Much of the content of the "unreasonably dangerous" element is
therefore retained in the plaintiff's burden of proving causation.
In dictum, however, the Cronin court extended its holding to
design cases,30 thus creating the potential for serious confusion. By
23. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209
(Alaska 1975); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973),
overruled by Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 000, 386 A.2d 816, 829
(1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
25. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
26. See note 8 supra.
27. See 8 Cal.3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
28. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155-56, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435-36.
29. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
30. In Cronin, the court stated,
We recognize that the words "unreasonably dangerous" may also serve
the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from being treated as the
insurer of its products. However, we think that such protective end is at-
[Vol. 63:773
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eliminating the "unreasonably dangerous" element from the plain-
tiff's burden 'of proof, the court implied that cost-benefit analysis
would not be the test for liability in such cases, but offered no alterna-
tive way to define what constitutes a "defective" design.3 '
Although some courts have followed Cronin in flaw cases, 32 the
overwhelming majority of courts3 and commentators" have rejected
both the holding and the dictum in that case. The fact that Cronin
has caused little lasting confusion is proof of the strength of the
growing consensus concerning the appropriateness of using the cost-
benefit analysis in defective product design cases. In the judgment
of most post-Cronin commentators, the only intelligent approach to
the issue of defective product design involves cost-benefit analysis.3
If the concept of unreasonable design risk "rings of negligence," so
be it.
Before proceeding with an analysis of cases, an additional pre-
liminary matter must be clarified. Some observers, including this
writer, have argued that a vaguely formulated reasonableness stan-
dard, such as a cost-benefit analysis, when applied on a case-by-case
basis with no further definition, inevitably presents courts with a
succession of judgmental tasks for which they are not well-suited.3 1
The adjudicatory process is most appropriate for resolving issues by
the application of rules sufficiently specific and defined to permit the
parties to argue rationally that a proper application of the rules dic-
tates a certain result.37 The adjudicatory process is inadequate as a
tained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture
or design of the product and that such defect was a proximate cause of the
injuries. Although the seller should not be responsible for all injuries involv-
ing the use of its products, it should be liable for all injuries proximately
caused by any of its products which are adjudged "defective."
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation to the
full range of products liability situations, including those involving "design
defects." A defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from
the hand of the workman.
8 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
31. See id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43. See generally
Keeton, supra note 10, at 30-32.
32. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
33. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
34. See commentators cited in note 10 supra.
35. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 10, at 37-39.
36. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 649-52; Henderson, supra note 4, at 1531-
34, 1539; Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Pro-
posed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. Rav. 625, 626 (1978); Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational
Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw.
U. L. Rav. 1, 51-57 (1974).
37. For a more thorough discussion of the limits of adjudication see Henderson,
supra note 4, at 1534-36, wherein the author discusses two seminal articles on the
19791
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method of resolving, on a case-by-case basis, the vague question of
whether or not risks presented by a particular product are unreasona-
ble.3 When forced to make such decisions, courts must resolve com-
plex and often times highly technical issues of design alternatives
equipped only with legal principle reduced to its most basic degree
of generalization: a balancing test. In effect, the courts are forced to
second-guess the designers; they are forced to redesign the product
themselves. 9 The result is to push the adjudicatory process to the
brink of arbitrariness. Unless more specific middle ground rules of
decision, consistent with the underlying cost-benefit principles, are
developed, foreseeability, consistency, and other qualities of princi-
pled decisionmaking will continue to be lacking and the integrity of
the judicial system will continue to be threatened."
subject by Professor Fuller. See also Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960
Pnoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis.
L. RFv. 3.
38. See Henderson, supra note 36, at 626:
In this instance, the mischief may be described succinctly: the defect con-
cept, upon which section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is prem-
ised, is an inadequate tool with which to determine liability in cases involv-
ing harm alleged to have been tortiously caused by manufacturers' conscious
design choices. This inadequacy does not stem from the fact that the defect
concept excludes important factors from consideration in design cases.
Rather, the defect concept includes too many loosely interrelated factors,
important and trivial, and renders impossible the essentially linear chains
of logic upon which arguments in adjudication are of necessity based. In
cases involving manufacturing flaws, the product design provides a specific,
built-in standard against which to measure the legal adequacy of the particu-
lar product that injured the plaintiff. However, when the plaintiff attacks
the product design itself, in the absence of any express promises or relevant
statutory requirements regarding performance or design, no such specific,
built-in standard is available. Instead, courts must rely upon the vague tort
standard of "reasonableness under all the circumstances" in determining
whether or not product designs are defective.
39. The court, like the defendant-designer, is not, of course, required to decide
what would be an optimally safe product, but only what would be a reasonably safe
product. Therefore, to the extent that the court is forced to balance the marginal risks
and benefits of a design it is forced to reproduce the same process of decisionmaking
followed by the designer. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
40. Confronted with the hopeless difficulties of trying to redesign products
via adjudication and presumably unable to resist the social pressures gener-
ally favoring injured plaintiffs, courts would inevitably resort to some form
of judicial coin-flipping, i.e., they would begin to determine defendants'
liability on some arbitrary basis rather than on the purported basis of the
reasonableness of the product designs brought before them. Efforts to estab-
lish meaningful design standards would be abandoned in favor of allowing
juries to determine defendants' liability upon no more substantial ground
than their own untutored "good judgment," or whim. The shift in the basis
of manufacturers' liability would be disguised, consciously or otherwise, by
[Vol. 63:773
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These arguments are based on concern with the "process" of
decisionmaking in product design cases. These process-oriented argu-
ments recognize the underlying legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis as
a matter of substance; indeed, they accept it as a premise.4 The
difficulty stems not from the inappropriateness of reasonableness as
a substantive matter but from the mismatch of a vague rule of sub-
stance and a process of decision that requires substantive rules of
greater specificity. What is called for is not the abandonment of
reasonableness as the underlying conceptual basis of liability, but the
working out of more specific rules of decision that reflect, without
requiring frequent judicial reliance upon, the vague reasonableness
standard. Although courts will hopefully play a role in the develop-
ment of such rules,42 it is likely that legislation will be necessary. 3 In
any event, some judicial cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis
is recognized as inevitable."
The present analysis is not intended in any way as an abandon-
ment of the process concerns expressed elsewhere by this writer.'5
Indeed, the major significance of these recent decisions from a process
perspective is the threat they pose to the ability of courts to partici-
pate in working out solutions to the problems involved in the inherent
limits of adjudication. From a process perspective, the criticisms that
follow are offered in a spirit of exasperation: Things were bad enough,
why make them worse?
heavy reliance upon the unsupported opinions of experts relating to the
ultimate issue of the reasonableness of defendants' conscious design choices.
The absence of any viable product safety standards with which to decide
these cases, however, would be obvious even to the casual observer. In effect,
the adjudicative process would largely become a sham. Although such tactics
might render these cases manageable in the short run, they would do so at
the cost of a serious erosion of confidence in the courts by those litigants who
would correctly come to realize that they have been denied effective access
to the adjudicative process by such subterfuge.
Henderson, supra note 4, at 1558. See also Henderson, supra note 36, at 626.
41. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 4, at 1540 ("Intelligent answers to the ques-
tions of 'How much product safety is enough?'. . . can only be provided by a process
that considers such factors as market price, functional utility, and aesthetics, as well
as safety, and achieves the proper balance among them.").
42. See note 65 infra.
43. See generally Epstein, supra note 6, at 660-61; Henderson, supra note 36, at
626-27.
44. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 4, at 1577 ("Courts should resist the pres-
sures to adjudicate the reasonableness of conscious design choices, and give in only in
those few cases where the polycentricity of the question can be narrowed and a judicial
resolution appears preferable to no solution at all."). For a further discussion of the
concept of polycentricity see notes 78-83 infra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 10; Henderson, supra note 36.
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m]. THREATS TO THE CONSENSUS: BARKER, AZZARELLO
AND SCHULDIES
A. THE Barker DECISION IN CALIFORNIA
Of the recent design defect decisions examined in this Article,
the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co." is undoubtedly the most significant. Emanating
from the court that spawned Cronin47 six years earlier, the Barker
panel expressly sought to eliminate confusion over the application of
the earlier decision to the issue of defective product design." Moreo-
ver, it acknowledged the legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis in design
cases, and thus may lull some observers into viewing the decision as
an acceptable resolution of the design defect issue. The Barker court,
however, applied the cost-benefit analysis with a unique twist which,
if taken literally in cases to come, would undermine any chance the
California courts might otherwise have had to maintain a degree of
integrity of their design defect decisions."
On its facts, Barker is typical of an increasingly important cate-
gory of product design cases involving industrial machinery. The
plaintiff, an industrial worker, was injured on the job when a high lift
loader, operated by the plaintiff and manufactured by defendant Lull
Engineering Co., tipped over and spilled its contents." The plaintiffs
experts testified that the machine should have been, but was not,
equipped with several safety devices. The trial court, refusing to
apply the Cronin rule in a design case, instructed the jury that "strict
liability for a defect in design of a product is based on a finding that
the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use." 5' The
jury returned a general verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California held that the instructions on the design
defect issue were erroneous in two respects: first, an injured plaintiff
should not be required to prove that a product design is unreasonably
dangerous; and second, a product's reasonably foreseeable use, as
well as its intended use, should be considered in evaluating the defec-
tiveness of its design."
The first of these holdings, relating to the question of unreasona-
ble danger, is of particular interest here. In considering whether the
46. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
47. See notes 23-31 supra and accompanying text.
48. See generally notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
49. See generally notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
50. 20 Cal. 3d at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
51. Id. at 422 n.4, 573 P.2d at 449 n.4, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231 n.4.
52. 20 Cal. 3d at 426 n.9, 573 P.2d at 451-52 n.9, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.9. The
court was correct in its conclusion that the "intended use" only requirement is incon-
sistent with prior case law. See notes 54-58 infra and accompanying text.
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plaintiff is a design case should be required to demonstrate that the
design is unreasonably dangerous, the court recognized that its deci-
sion in Cronin had generated confusion in the lower courts. In that
decision, the court in Barker explained, it had meant what it
said-the "unreasonably dangerous" terminology should not be uti-
lized, even in cases involving allegedly defective designs. But, the
court had never intended to imply what some commentators had
inferred: that the defect concept, unadorned, should be the sole test
for liability. Instead, the court's intent in Cronin had been to free
lower courts to develop alternatives to the "unreasonably dangerous"
terminology.5 3 The opinion in Barker reflects the California high
court's disappointment that such development had not taken place.
In any event, the court in Barker concluded that the time had
come to set matters straight. Henceforth, two tests, among others
that may yet be devised by lower courts in these cases, will be accept-
able in California:
[un design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that
a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,
or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the rele-
vant factors, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.5'
The first of these proposed tests is not new and is not likely to be
controversial. It has been recognized by courts55 and commentators,"
and is consistent with traditional approaches in that it expressly
places the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Indeed, except for an
occasional suggestion to the contrary,57 the "consumer expectations"
approach is probably just one method of expressing the well-accepted
"reasonableness under the circumstances" test in which the design
defect issue is determined by means of a cost-benefit analysis.,
53. 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
54. 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 234.
55. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E. 2d 738, 741-42 (Ind.
App. 1976); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d
326, 330, 230 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1975). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrS
§ 402A, Comments g & i (1965); note 12 supra.
56. See, e.g., Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another
Citadel Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 298, 308-09, 315-16 (1977); Shapo, A Representa-
tional Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1294-96 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 474, 435 P.2d 806, 809
(1967); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing
Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERcER L. Rxv. 465, 468-70 (1978).
58. This conclusion seems inescapable if the test is "reasonable expectations"
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The second test advanced in the Barker decision, purporting to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, represents a radical depar-
ture from tradition that could wreak havoc for years to come. Ironi-
cally, the Barker court seems to have gone out of its way to ensure
that the new test will be applied literally. The court began by recog-
nizing that cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in determining the
defectiveness of product designs." To make strict liability unequivo-
cally distinct from negligence, however, the court deemed it neces-
sary to shift to the defendant manufacturer the burden of proving
that the benefits of the defendant's design choices outweighed their
associated risks. 0 The plaintiff will not enjoy this advantage in every
case; the burden will be shifted only after the plaintiff proves that
the product design proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. Lest any
doubt remain that the court meant exactly what it said, the opinion
emphasized that the defendant's burden under this new test encom-
passes both the burden of persuasion and the burden of coming for-
ward with evidence."
Unless the California courts retreat from the literal meaning of
the words used in the Barker opinion, the ability of courts to reach
consistent results in clear cases will be seriously threatened. Thus,
the integrity of judicial treatment of product design cases in that
state will be undermined.2 If the new test for liability is applied
literally, every plaintiff represented by at least minimally competent
counsel should succeed in shifting the burden to the defendant; and
no defendant however capably represented will succeed, other than
by agreeing to settle, in avoiding the retrospective evaluation of its
design choices by lay jurors." Directed verdicts for defendants, tradi-
and the tribunal is asked to determine how much safety a consumer has a right to
expect. If the California court intends the standard to be based on actual consumer
expectations, then presumably it will require factual proof of those expectations, and
the test will be essentially empirical. Cf. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 470-
75, 435 P.2d 806, 808-10 (1967) (jury must be presented with evidence of actual con-
sumer expectations before it can decide whether product performed as an ordinary
consumer would have expected).
59. 20 Cal. 3d at 433-34, 573 P.2d at 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
60. 20 Cal.3d at 433, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238:
[I]n Cronin our principal concern was that the "unreasonably dangerous"
language of the Restatement test had "burdened the injured plaintiff with
proof of an element which rings of negligence" . . . and had consequently
placed "a considerably greater burden upon [the injured plaintiff] than
that articulated in Greenman." . . . By shifting the burden of proof to the
manufacturer to demonstrate that an injury-producing product is not defec-
tive in design, the above standard should lighten the plaintiff's burden in
conformity with our Greenman and Cronin decisions.
61. See 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
62. See generally notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
63. Given the procedural context of the cases here being considered-i.e., issues
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tionally an important protection against arbitrary jury decisions in
cases of doubtful merit, will occur even less frequently under the
Barker rule literally applied than they occur under the existing ma-
jority rule. 4
The obvious significance of denying courts the opportunity to
direct verdicts for defendants is that plaintiffs may be able to win
more cases. But the real significance of Barker goes beyond the imme-
diate effect it may have on the distribution of wealth, significant
though such an effect might be. Indeed, one may have faith in the
ability of most jurors to refuse recovery in meritless cases and still be
concerned with the implications of the Barker decision. At the heart
of the problem is the very different function performed by judges and
juries in the adjudicative process. Jury decisions are, by hypothesis,
unique to the facts of particular cases; what one jury decides in one
case in no way binds the next jury in the next case. In contrast,
whenever judges decide cases for defendants as a matter of law, po-
tentially, at least, they establish precedents that are binding in future
cases. Of course, a judge in a particular case, lacking an adequately
specific rule of decision, may respond intuitively in deciding that the
plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof. Even if such a deci-
sion has relatively little precedential value in and of itself, over time
it can be hoped that middle ground categorizations will emerge that
reflect the patterns of judicial reactions in individual cases. In fact,
this describes fairly accurately the common law process of incremen-
tal rule development which is nowhere more needed presently than
in the field of liability for defective product design. 5 At the very least,
it is to be expected that the reactions of judges when confronted with
questions of "reasonable" design, even if they are no less intuitive
than the reactions of a jury," will tend to be more consistent given
the opportunity to participate in a number of cases.
on appeal concerning appropriate jury instructions-the text will refer to "sending
design cases to the jury." Obviously, the analysis applies equally to situations in which
the judge functions as the trier of fact.
64. Indeed, it appears likely that directed verdicts under the new Barker rule
would more often than not be rendered against, rather than in favor of, defendant
manufacturers.
65. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. Were the burden of proof to
remain with the plaintiff, as under traditional approaches, the direction of a verdict
for the defendant would imply nothing more than that this particular plaintiff's proof
failed; the court would be free to listen to a different plaintiff's arguments in a different
case. Even though judges in subsequent cases would be free to address the issue
notwithstanding direction of verdicts for defendants in previous cases, if sufficient
numbers of such tentative decisions were to occur across a range of slightly differing
fact patterns, it is likely that some judge would survey the decisional patterns and
establish a relatively specific rule for the future.
66. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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Any chance of assuring this minimal consistency in outcome,
however, or of engaging in this important process of middle ground
rule formulation, depends on the ability of courts to direct verdicts
for defendants in clear cases. Even if a majority of jurors can be
expected to react rationally, the system should attempt to provide
protection against the occasionally irrational verdict in a clear case.
At the very least, precious judicial resources are wasted when juries
are relied on to decide cases that should, as a matter of law, be
recognized as without merit. A system that sends every case to the
jury is, in the final analysis, a lawless system." That even the Su-
preme Court of California would be unhappy with such a regime is
suggested by the Barker protestation against holding manufacturers
absolutely liable in products cases." Indeed, it is likely that the court
failed to appreciate fully the implications of its holding.
To appreciate the implications of the new test advanced in
Barker, it is useful to compare that test with the traditional approach
it purports to replace. Under existing law, the plaintiff in a design
case typically argues that one or more alternative design choices were
available at the time the product was designed which, had they been
adopted by the defendant, would have reduced or prevented the
plaintiff's injuries."9 The plaintiff's lawyer will almost always be able
to hypothesize an alternative that would have helped his client to
escape injury. As experienced products liability lawyers appreciate,
the difficulties of proving a case come not in positing potentially
helpful design alternatives, but in establishing their cost-
effectiveness. To carry his burden of producing sufficient evidence to
get to the jury on the question of the cost-effectiveness of a posited
design alternative, the plaintiff frequently must rely on speculative,
hypothetical expert testimony. 0 As a general rule, the more question-
67. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The easy but timid way out for a trial judge is to leave all cases tried to
a jury for jury determination, but in so doing he fails in his duty. . . . A timid judge,
like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless judge.").
68. "[The new] text for defective design. . . subjects a manufacturer to liabil-
ity whenever there is something 'wrong' with a product's design . . . while stopping
short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which may result from the
use of its product." 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (emphasis
added).
69. Although proof of a practical alternative is not often imposed explicitly as a
formal requirement, plaintiffs in most design cases are forced by the circumstances to
establish the defectiveness of the defendants' designs by pointing to a safer alternative.
See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 335, 154 N.W.2d 488, 498
(1967). Cf. note 11 supra and accompanying text (use of cost-benefit analysis). See
generally Henderson, supra note 4, at 1565-73.
70. See generally Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 16; Phil-
lips, supra note 5, at 112-19.
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able the plaintiff's claim on the merits, the more speculative the
testimony upon which he must rely. In cases of doubtful merit, courts
can and do step in and direct verdicts for defendants on the ground
that the plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of producing evi-
dence."
In contrast to the traditional approach just described, under
Barker, the cost-effectiveness issue has been divorced from the issue
of proximate cause and has for the first time been made part of the
defendant's case. In effect, the plaintiff's lawyer is released by the
Barker rule from the requirement of establishing practical feasibility
as part of his prima facie case. Instead, the plaintiff is required only
to posit an alternative that could have been adopted by the defendant
and that would have been helpful in reducing or avoiding the plain-
tiff's injuries. Once the plaintiff does this much (and absent any
necessary concern for practicability, it is not much), he has estab-
lished his prima facie case under the Barker rule: that the defen-
dant's design choices proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Thereafter, under Barker, it is up to the defendant to prove that its
design choices were reasonable in -light of available alternatives.
Given this significant lessening of the plaintiff's burden, plaintiffs
should succeed in establishing a prima facie case in virtually every
instance.12
The manner in which plaintiffs will invariably establish a prima
facie case under the Barker test can be illustrated by means of a
hypothetical example. Assume that the plaintiff is a ten-year-old boy
who receives head injuries when he trips on a sidewalk and falls head
first into the side of a parked automobile. Assume further that his
head strikes an unyielding panel of reinforced sheet metal constitut-
ing the outer skin of the vehicle. Under existing law, one might safely
assume that the plaintiff would have a difficult time getting to the
jury in such a case. Obviously, he might insist that the defendant
auto manufacturer should have padded the side of the vehicle, and
that such a design alternative would have reduced or perhaps even
eliminated his injuries. But the plaintiff could not hope to carry his
burden of producing sufficient evidence to support a favorable con-
clusion on the issue of the cost effectiveness of his suggested design
alternative. No auto manufacturer installs this type of padding on the
71. For a good example of the sort of difficulty the plaintiff can expect in such a
case, see Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
72. The only situations in which the plaintiff would not succeed in establishing
a prima facie case would be those in which there was obviously nothing the manufac-
turer could have done to prevent the harm-where, for example, a plaintiff, having
tripped over a book and fallen down a flight of stairs, sues the book manufacturer on
a theory of defective design.
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outside of its vehicles. The plaintiff would only be able to offer theo-
retical expert testimony in an effort to overcome the presumption of
adequacy favoring existing designs under the current majority rule.3
Confronted with little more than untested, hypothetical testimony
from the plaintiff's expert, the trial court could be expected to step
in at the end of the plaintiff's case and direct a verdict for the defen-
dant on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima
facie case. Under existing law, a sensible plaintiff's lawyer would look
for someone else to sue-,perhaps the maintainer of the sidewalk
whose negligence, it could be alleged, caused the boy to trip.74
If the Barker test is applied literally, a rather different scenario
would unfold in the hypothetical case just described. Beyond doubt,
the plaintiff could establish his prima facie case of proximate cause.
The manufacturer, it would be argued, should have padded the side
of the car in a described manner. An expert on behalf of the plaintiff
would testify that padding could have been supplied, and that if the
right amount had been in place the head injuries would not have
occurred. For reasons that will become clear, the plaintiff would not
be nearly so concerned, as he would be under existing law, with
whether it would have been practical to include that amount of pad-
ding. For purposes of this analysis, however, it is assumed that the
plaintiff could show that the amount needed to make a difference was
not, on its face, outrageously impractical. 5 According to the explicit
terms of the Barker holding, the plaintiff need not demonstrate its
cost-effectiveness as part of his prima facie case. Thus, he would have
established that the defendant's choice of unyielding sheet metal
proximately caused his injuries, and the burden would shift to the
defendant to justify its design choices.76
73. The word "presumption" is not used here in a technical, legal sense. Rather,
it refers to an evidentiary technique frequently employed by plaintiffs under existing
law: pointing to the fact that other manufacturers did provide the safer alternative that
the defendant allegedly should have provided, plaintiffs attempt to carry their burden
of proof of unreasonable design. Where such proof is not available, the plaintiff has a
more difficult evidentiary task. To be sure, a whole industry may have lagged and
fallen below acceptable design standards, but as a practical matter, that circumstance
is more difficult to prove. See note 86 infra.
74. American courts have generally denied recovery to pedestrians and bicyclists
who have sued automobile manufacturers following collisions with stationary vehicles.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford
Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958). See generally Note, The Automo-
bile Manufacturer's Liability to Pedestrians for Exterior Design: New Dimensions in
"Crashworthiness," 71 MicH. L. Rav. 1654, 1668-75 (1973).
75. If it would require six inches of foam rubber to protect the plaintiff, the case
would probably best be categorized as a "nothing would help" case. See note 72 supra;
text accompanying notes 87 & 88 infra.
76. Of course, a trial court might conclude that the plaintiff had failed to estab-
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Of course, the ease with which a plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case and avoid a directed verdict after presenting his evidence
will not be particularly significant so long as the court is in a position,
at the end of the presentation of the defendant's evidence, to direct
a verdict for the defendant in a case that is obviously without merit.
Although such an approach might involve some waste of judicial
resources,77 at least defendants would be protected against irresponsi-
ble jury verdicts. Under a literal application of Barker, however, it is
not likely that the defendant would ever be able to introduce suffi-
cient evidence to warrant a directed verdict in its favor at the close
of the trial.
The unlikelihood of a defendant prevailing as a matter of law
flows directly from the unique nature of the issue for decision in a
product design case. In the final analysis, a judgment of whether a
design is unreasonably dangerous is a value judgment, requiring in
most cases the evaluation and balancing of many interrelated factors.
This judgmental task has elsewhere been described by this writer as
polycentric. s Polycentric tasks are planning tasks whose various ele-
ments are as interrelated as the strands of an intricate web.79 No
single element may adequately be considered in isolation from the
others; as one aspect is altered hypothetically for purposes of evalua-
tion and analysis, the network of interconnections causes all the other
aspects and elements to adjust and change correspondingly.
lish a prima facie case because the plaintiff had failed to show that injuries of this sort
were "reasonably foreseeable." Such a ruling would be contrary to the new approach
in Barker, however, where the defendant, and not the plaintiff, must rely on the
unlikelihood of injury as a part of proving the cost-ineffectiveness of padding. To
require the plaintiff to show that unpadded vehicle exteriors cause much harm would
be, in effect, to require the plaintiff to prove the cost-effectiveness of padding.
77. As a practical matter, trial courts may wait until the end of trial to direct
verdicts, or may even wait until a jury returns a plaintiff's verdict to enter a judgment
for defendant notwithstanding the verdict. If either approach is routinely adopted,
then the cost implications of the Barker case referred to in the text will be small.
78. See Henderson, supra note 4, at 1534-42.
79. See id. at 1536:
If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur
throughout the entire web. If another strand is pulled, the relationships
among all the strands will again be readjusted. A lawyer seeking to base his
argument upon established principle and required to address himself in dis-
course to each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his task frustratingly
impossible. As he moved from the first point of his argument to the second
and then to the third, he would find his arguments regarding the earlier
points shifting beneath him. Unlike most of the traditional types of cases in
which litigants are able, in effect, to freeze the rest of the web as they
concentrate upon each separate strand, the web here retains its natural
flexibility, adjusting itself in seemingly infinite variations as each new point,
or strand, in the argument is reached.
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As noted earlier, this writer has employed the concept of polycen-
tricity to argue that courts are inherently unsuited to address the
questions of defective product design on a case-by-case basis, aided
by nothing more specific than a test of "reasonableness under the
circumstances."8 Essentially, these process concerns stem from the
unique kind of participation promised to litigants that sets adjudica-
tion apart as a decisional process: the opportunity to present proofs
and arguments to an impartial tribunal that is bound to determine
the relevant facts and to apply legal rules to reach reasoned results.
Implicit in this promise of participation is the necessity that the
proofs and arguments be based on rules that are specific enough to
enable litigants to argue rationally that a proper application of the
legal rules will'obligate the court to come to a certain result. To be
sure, the exercise of some discretion in judicial decisionmaking is
both beneficial and inevitable; however, legal rules must be specific
enough to arrange the issues for decision into an essentially linear
configuration, allowing each issue to be addressed and, in effect,
resolved before moving on to the next. Without such minimum specif-
icity, litigants confront an overwhelming number of permutations
and combinations of possibilities. Because subissues cannot be or-
dered and isolated for argument and decision, the participation of
litigants in the adjudicatory process is reduced to presenting more
and more conclusory arguments and proof on either side of the single
reasonableness issue, and finally, entreating the tribunal to exercise
its plenary discretion in their favor.
Putting these process concerns to one side for the moment, in the
present context of attempting to demonstrate that defendants will
almost never be able to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant di-
rected verdicts in their favor, the polycentricity concept has an addi-
tional, somewhat different relevance. For present purposes, the sig-
nificance of the polycentric quality of the design defect issue resides
in the following unique characteristic of such issues: unlike the more
focused issues traditionally presented in litigation guided by more
specific rules of decision, the task of resolving a polycentric issue
typically becomes more, rather than less, difficult with the addition
of evidence and argument." As more elements are examined, the
combinations and permutations of interconnected possibilities ex-
pand geometrically; the more elaborate the arguments made by both
sides, the more confusing the issue for decision is likely to be.82 Since
80. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
81. Anyone who has ever tried to select an oriental rug from a large collection
will appreciate intuitively the validity of the point being made here. Quite literally in
these cases, the more you learn the more difficult it is to decide.
82. For a treatment of the problems associated with expert testimony in products
[Vol. 63:773
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
both sides will introduce relevant data for consideration, and since
in the ensuing "battle of experts" every technical point will be met
with counterpoints that, in turn, will stimulate counter-counter-
points, it is unlikely that the defendant will succeed in rendering the
reasonableness issue so clear that reasonable minds could not differ.
Virtually all product design cases will therefore go to the jury under
the Barker test literally applied.m
That plaintiffs would succeed in reaching juries under the Barker
rule in practically every case may be illustrated by returning to the
hypothetical example of the young plaintiff who bangs his head into
a parked automobile. After the plaintiff establishes his prima facie
case that the hardness of the vehicle's sheet metal side proximately
caused his injuries and that padding would have helped reduce or
eliminate the injuries, the defendant manufacturer will bear the bur-
den of producing evidence in support of its decision to use unpadded
sheet metal. Assuming that the plaintiff's insistence on padding is
more than a little dubious, the defendant would succeed in carrying
its burden of coming forward with evidence and thus would avoid a
directed verdict for the plaintiff. Padding, after all, is expensive and
would add to the maintenance costs. Moreover, sheet metal provides
a beneficial safety factor in other auto collision contexts. Once the
defendant has carried its burden of coming forward, the plaintiff will
introduce evidence supporting the cost-effectiveness of padding as an
alternative to reinforced sheet metal. Padding, it turns out, is not
nearly so expensive as the defendant would have one believe. Mainte-
nance costs could be minimized by toughening the outer skin. Fur-
thermore, the safety factor associated with sheet metal, exaggerated
in the defendant's presentation, could be duplicated by strengthening
the inside panels along the sides of the automobile. Since motor
vehicles are ubiquitous on the streets of America, collisions between
vehicles and pedestrians are a significant source of accident costs;84
the marginal savings in life and limb would more than outweigh any
marginal increase in costs generated by the installation of padding.
Finally, the fact that no automobile manufacturer to date has chosen
to pad the exterior of its vehicles is no bar to recovery."
liability cases, see authorities cited in note 70 supra, and for a treatment of similar
problems in the field of medical malpractice litigation, see Myers, "The Battle of the
Experts:" A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NB. L. REv.
539 (1965).
83. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
84. See generally Note, supra note 74, at 1654.
85. The general rule in torts is that conformance with industry custom does not
bar recovery. See T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
This rule is recognized in product design cases. See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder
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Bearing in mind that the plaintiff need only keep the issue in
reasonable doubt to be entitled to reach the jury, one can easily
imagine that, even in this rather outlandish example, a trial court
would refuse to direct a verdict for the defendant under a vague
standard of "reasonableness under all the circumstances." Admit-
tedly, the plaintiff's evidence would be no more convincing than it
would have been under the traditional approach where the plaintiff
would have presumably suffered a directed verdict for defendant. But
the standard against which the plaintiff's evidence is measured would
under Barker be very different. Under the traditional approach, the
plaintiff bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to put the
design defect issue in reasonable doubt, and courts can occasionally
direct verdicts for defendants by pointing to the speculative nature
of the plaintiff's proof. Under the new test in Barker, however, the
defendant bears that burden. Thus, under Barker it will be the defen-
dant who is forced, to some extent at least, to rely on speculative,
hypothetical testimony to support the reasonableness of its design
choices;" the plaintiff need only fend off the defendant's evidentiary
points with equally credible points of his own.
A caveat is in order with respect to the conclusions just reached
in connection with the hypothetical example. In an earlier discussion
of the proximate cause aspects of the example," it was assumed that
the plaintiff could establish that some conceivably feasible amount
of padding would have helped to reduce the plaintiff's injuries. Al-
though it is correctly observed in that earlier discussion that the
plaintiff would be not nearly so concerned with cost-effectiveness as
he would be under existing law, now it must be explicitly recognized
that even under Barker the plaintiff cannot totally abandon a concern
for practicality. For example, if it would have required a minimum
of six inches of exterior padding to have helped the plaintiff in the
hypothetical case, the arguments on the issue of feasibility would be
so imbalanced as to permit a directed verdict for the defendant not-
withstanding the shifted burden of proof. Such a case may be seen
as an exception to the general rule, recognized earlier, that compe-
tently represented plaintiffs will always be able to establish proxi-
mate cause." In choosing this "padded car" example to illustrate the
risks inherent in the Barker approach, the Author may appear to have
Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Murray v. Bullard Co., 110 N.H.
220, 265 A.2d 309 (1970).
86. It is an unavoidable fact of life that convincing, or even credible, evidence
regarding costs and benefits is difficult to obtain. See, e.g., Conway v. O'Brien, 111
F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
87. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text.
88. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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gone too far from the start, picking an example so outrageous that
even under a literal application of Barker, the defendant would pre-
vail as a matter of law.
It takes only a relatively minor adjustment in the facts of the
hypothetical case, however, to dispel any serious doubts about the
extent of the problems that Barker creates. Suppose that instead of
injuring himself on the unyielding side panel of a car, the young
plaintiff trips, falls, and lacerates the right side of his face on a sharp
ridge on the top of the fender. Assume further that it is clear that a
smoother, rounder, albeit non-padded, surface would have practi-
cally eliminated serious injury to the boy. For the reasons advanced
above, a trial court that adhered to the Barker rule in such a case
would face a very difficult task in rationalizing a directed verdict for
the defendant. Although courts have not allowed recovery in similar
cases under existing law,' Barker supplies an analytical framework
in which recovery, given a favorable jury verdict, would be all but
impossible to judicially deny. And, after a number of plaintiffs have
succeeded in reaching juries in a range of pedestrian-vehicle collision
cases involving a variety of exterior design components, who could
say with confidence that one-half inch of padding would be so absurd
in such a "brave new system" as to justify directing a verdict for the
defendant? The "padded car" illustration may strike some readers as
so extreme as to be inappropriate as an example of the risks posed
by the Barker decision. If the new California test is applied literally
and enthusiastically in years to come, however, this writer predicts
that comparable cases will come to be accepted as routine.
These conclusions regarding the unlikelihood of product design
defendants prevailing as a matter of law under Barker are supported
by the traditional patterns of decision, drawn from all legal fields, in
which courts have directed verdicts in favor of parties bearing the
burden of proof.' A careful examination of such cases reveals that,
without exception, courts have had available to them specific stan-
dards that substantially eliminated the openendedness and polycen-
tricity of the issues for decision." The availability of specific stan-
dards in such cases transforms the issues for decision from ones of
"reasonableness under all the circumstances," which would almost
89. See cases cited in note 74 supra.
90. See generally F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, Cwm PnocEDUR 247-49 (2d ed. 1977).
91. Frequently, the specific standard is contained in a contract between the
parties. See, e.g., Holz Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 45, 533 P.2d
1055, 120 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1975). In negligence cases, a specific safety statute may
provide the basis for "negligence per se." See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164,
126 N.E. 814 (1920). See generally Note, Directing the Verdict in Favor of the Party
with the Burden of Proof, 50 N.C. L. REV. 843 (1972).
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always present questions of credibility, evaluation, and competing
inferences, into relatively narrow issues of primary fact. In the ab-
sence of legitimate controversy over the actual facts in such cases,
directed verdicts for the parties bearing the burden of proof are justi-
fied. When specific standards are not available, directing verdicts for
parties bearing the burden of proof has universally been recognized
as inappropriate, especially when the evidence is conflicting. 2 Hence,
in the absence of specific rules of decision in product design cases, it
would represent a radical departure from precedent were courts to
direct verdicts for defendant manufacturers bearing the burden of
proving a conclusion as openendedly polycentric as the
"reasonableness of the defendant's design choices under the circum-
stances."
Of course, even under Barker, trial courts could direct verdicts
for defendants in design cases if the courts were ready to establish
relatively specific rules of decision governing the various categories
of product designs. 3 But such a process of judicial rule development
will almost certainly not occur under the new approach announced
in Barker. As was observed earlier, under existing law, a trial judge
who feels that a product design case is without merit can justify a
directed verdict for the defendant in terms of the plaintiff's failure
to carry his burden of producing evidence, without stating a specific
rule of decision." If sufficient numbers of judges in similar cases react
similarly, a rule eventually emerges. By removing the opportunity of
justifying a directed verdict for the defendant in terms of the plain-
tiff's burden of production, the new test in Barker threatens to bring
this incremental process of rule development, slow enough under ex-
isting law,9 5 to a halt. Under the regime inaugurated by that decision,
courts will be required to choose between resorting to the extraordi-
nary judicial technique of formulating rules "once and for all" with
which to direct verdicts for defendants in cases of doubtful merit,"6
92. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913); George Foltis, Inc. v.
City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 119-23, 38 N.E. 2d 455, 459-63 (1941); Sams v. Albers
Super Markets, Inc., 86 Ohio App. 167, 169-70, 89 N.E. 2d 101, 103 (1949); MacDonald
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 562-63, 36 A.2d 492, 494-95 (1944); Wyatt v. Moran,
81 R.I. 399, 404-05, 103 A.2d 801, 803-04 (1954); Terwilliger v. Marion, 222 S.C. 185,
187, 72 S.E. 2d 165, 166 (1952); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Roberts, 135 Tex. 123,
128, 139 S.W.2d 80, 83 (1940).
93. For example, in the earlier hypothetical situation involving the feasibility of
padding the outsides of automobiles, the court could conclude that reasonable minds
could not differ on the issue-i.e., that the only inference possible from the defendant's
proof is that padding is not required. In effect, the court would be creating a specific
"per se" rule upon which to base that conclusion.
94. See text accompanying notes 65 & 66 supra.
95. See note 151 infra and acompanying text.
96. Perhaps the most famous example of this technique is Justice Holmes' opin-
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or sending those cases to the jury. It is too much to expect that courts
will formulate standards on their own; sending cases to the jury will
come to be the only judicial response in product design cases decided
under the vague standard of "reasonableness under the circumstan-
ces." The Supreme Court of California may have believed that it
could benefit plaintiffs "somewhat" by shifting the burden of proof
to defendants, without undermining the integrity of the common law
system of liability for defective product design. It should be clear that
this was a serious error. The new test in Barker will, if accepted
generally and applied literally, eliminate any opportunity for judicial
rule development in this difficult area of products liability.
Notwithstanding the concern expressed in the foregoing para-
graphs, some observers can be expected to attempt to justify the
Barker rule by viewing it as analogous to the traditional application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 7 In that connection, it must be
understood that the situation in the typical product design case is
very different from the situation confronting the plaintiff in the clas-
sic case involving application of res ipsa loquitur. Two features of res
ipsa cases, neither of which are typically present in product design
cases, justify shifting the burden of proof to the defendant: First, the
circumstances in a res ipsa case strongly suggest that the plaintiff's
injury would not have occurred absent some act of negligence by the
defendant." Second, the defendant has relatively greater access to
information regarding what actually happened." In product design
cases, it is considered to be improper to infer a defect in design merely
because the plaintiff was injured while using, or otherwise being af-
fected by, a product."' To be sure, res ipsa was employed in early flaw
ion for a unanimous Court in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927),
in which the defendant was held to have established the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law based on the latter's failure to stop at a railroad crossing, get
out of his automobile, and look to see if a train was approaching: "[W]e are dealing
with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once
for all by the Courts." 275 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added). Significantly, the Court
reversed itself unanimously only seven years later, two years after Justice Holmes had
retired. See Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934).
97. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS §§ 39-40 (4th ed.
1971).
98. See generally id. § 39, at 214-21.
99. See generally id. § 39, at 225-26.
100. See, e.g., Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind. App. 1972);
South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
See also cases cited in note 10 supra.
The Supreme Court of California would appear to agree with this conclusion. See
note 68 supra and accompanying text. The Barker court undoubtedly believed that the
requirement that the plaintiff establish a proximate cause connection between the




cases to permit the jury to draw an inference of negligence from the
fact of a product flaw.'"' But, res ipsa was used in that context as a
transition device to achieve absolute manufacturers' liability for
harm caused by product flaws."' In the product design area, in con-
trast to cases involving flaws, "13 courts unanimously agree that manu-
facturers are not to be held absolutely liable for harm caused by their
product designs.' Moreover, unlike the situation in the typical res
ipsa case involving a product flaw, the defendant in a typical product
design case does not have substantially greater access than does the
plaintiff to pertinent information about feasible alternative design
choices."05 Further, modern rules of discovery are aimed at providing
the plaintiff with reasonable access to data concerning the defen-
dant's design procedures and choices."' Hence, the new test in Barker
receives little support by analogy to traditional applications of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Most courts in other jurisdictions that have considered Barker
have rejected it out of hand."17 Even within California it is not clear
101. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 459, 150 P.2d
436, 439 (1944).
102. See id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
103. See note 5 supra.
104. See note 100 supra.
105. The point is not that the resources or access to expertise of the typical
plaintiff are necessarily as great as are those of the typical corporate defendant. For a
description of the differences in resources between plaintiffs and defendants in this
regard, see Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1316 n.40, 1326-
27. Rather, the point is that the defendant does not exercise direct control over the
plaintiff's access to information regarding alternative design choices not adopted by
the defendant. A classic example of the defendant's control over the plaintiff's access
to information in a res ipsa setting is to be found in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d
486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), in which the only persons who could have known how the
plaintiff came to be injured were the defendants. The court assumed that unless the
burden was shifted to the defendants in that case they would refuse to tell the court
what they knew. Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689. In product design cases, however, the
plaintiff has access to independent experts who are capable of describing the range of
available alternative design choices. Although it may generally be true that manufac-
turers have an edge over plaintiffs regarding the numbers of experts at their command,
they have by no means cornered the market. Professor Donaher and his colleagues
conclude that the imbalance between plaintiffs and defendants can be redressed by
the courts being more liberal in qualifying plaintiffs' experts and in limiting "reckless"
cross-examination. See Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 1326-
27.
106. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 90, at 171-212; Hofeld,
Value of Discovery in a Products Liability Case, 14 TRiAL LAw. GUIDE 501 (1970).
107. See, e.g., Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 581 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz. App.
1978); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 411, 411, 579 P.2d 1287, 1287 (1978)
(denial of petition for rehearing) ("Under [Barker], it appears that a design defect
case will always go to the jury if only the plaintiff can show that the product caused
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whether lower courts will follow Barker literally, at least without
further importuning from their high court. In two recent product
design decisions by intermediate appellate courts in California, de-
fendants prevailed as a matter of law because the plaintiffs failed to
establish prima facie cases.' 8 The opinions reveal, however, that the
courts in those cases imposed upon the plaintiffs the burden of pro-
duction with regard to the issue of reasonableness. 0 In effect, the
intermediate appellate courts paid lip service to the new test an-
nounced in Barker and then proceeded to apply the traditional ap-
proach by building cost-benefit analysis back into the issue of proxi-
mate cause. Whether the Supreme Court of California will recognize
the good sense of such "glosses" on its decision, and choose to let
them stand, is an interesting question. This writer, obviously, would
urge the court to do exactly that. If, instead, the court insists that
its new test be applied literally, then the courts in other jurisdictions,
which are not so bound, should refuse to be taken in.
B. THE Azzarello DECISION IN PENNSYVANIA
Both the facts and the major issue on appeal in Azzarello v.
Black Brothers Company, Inc."' are similar to those of the Barker
case. The plaintiff, an industrial employee, was injured, allegedly
because of a defectively designed coating machine manufactured and
sold to plaintiffs employer by the defendant. Reacting to the plain-
tiff's theories of negligence and strict liability, the trial court's in-
structions to the jury relied heavily on the "defective condition unrea-
the injury."). See also Epstein, supra note 10, at 651 ("Barker represents all that is
unwise in design defect litigation."). But see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871 (Alaska 1979) (adopting Barker two-pronged test).
108. See Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1978); Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 895 (1978).
109. For example, the plaintiff in Garcia, a fencer, received facial injuries when
a sharp edged sabre penetrated the wire mesh of a fencing mask manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiff argued that it was foreseeable that sharp pointed sabres would
occasionally (albeit rarely and accidentally) be used, and that the mask should have
been designed differently to prevent penetration. The plaintiff's expert testified that
an alternative could have been adopted that would have prevented plaintiff's injuries.
The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof on
proximate cause and that the Barker rule would not apply to shift the burden of
proving reasonableness to the defendant. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had
failed to show that the same injury was not possible with any standard mask, the
evidence having shown that such masks "are not necessarily supposed to withstand
penetration by a broken blade." 84 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Clearly,
by invoking the norm of "standard masks," the court in Garcia placed a burden on
the plaintiff to establish that such masks, including the one he used, were unreasona-
bly dangerous in design.
110. 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978).
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sonably dangerous" language from section 402A of the Second Re-
statement of Torts."' Following a jury verdict for the defendant man-
ufacturer, the plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,12 following California's lead in
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,"' had eliminated the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" from the definition of defect. The superior
court, en banc, agreed with the plaintiff and ordered a new trial.",
The defendant appealed.
In a manner reminiscent of the California court in Barker, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seized upon this case as an opportun-
ity to articulate a new and different test for design defect and, in the
process, reached conclusions that can only be described as extraordi-
nary. At the outset, the court recognized the relevance of cost-benefit
analysis in cases of this sort, agreeing with the widely held view "that
the phrase 'unreasonably dangerous' serves a useful purpose in pre-
dicting liability""' 5 in the area of product design. Remarkably, how-
ever, the court concluded that the issue of unreasonable danger
should never be given to the jury to decide. Instead, issues such as
"when does the utility of a product outweigh the unavoidable danger
it may pose?" are exclusively questions of law for the judge."' "It is
a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiffs averment of
the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after this judicial
determination is made is the cause submitted to the jury to deter-
mine whether the facts of the case support the averments of the
complaint.""' 7
One could read the opinion as simply reaffirming the traditional
role of the trial judge in screening the adequacy of the plaintiff's case
as a response to a defendant's motion for directed verdict. But why,
then, speak in terms of the trial court's measuring the adequacy of
the plaintiff's "averments?" And what, at a minimum, must the
plaintiff aver? Obviously, the court will not require the plaintiff to
aver that the defendant's product design created unreasonable risks;
a major premise of the decision is that juries should not be allowed
to address that issue. But if the plaintiff is not to include averments
of unreasonable danger in his complaint, how may a trial court fairly
employ those concepts in testing the sufficiency of that complaint?
111. See id. at 1022. See also note 8 supra.
112. Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
113. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); see notes 23-35 supra
and accompanying text.
114. 391 A.2d at 1023.





And if judicial screening for adequacy is to take place at the pleading
stage, from what source will the court obtain the information neces-
sary to undertake a cost-benefit analysis?
The confusion in the Pennsylvania court's treatment of the divi-
sion of function between judge and jury finds its source in the erro-
neous notion that a cost-benefit analysis can somehow be useful for
the guidance of judges and lawyers but not for the juries of laypersons
to whom responsibility for decision will ultimately be given in close
cases. The court appears to have gotten this idea from Professor
Wade's formulation of the seven factors that are relevant in deter-
mining defective product design.' In his analysis, Professor Wade
addressed the question of whether the jury should invariably be in-
structed regarding all seven factors, concluding that such an ap-
proach is unnecessary."' Instead, he suggested that the jury typically
be given a shortened version, in which the concept of the "reasonable
manufacturer with knowledge of the risks" serves as a more readily
understandable surrogate for the list of factors."' Whenever one of the
factors plays an important role in a case, according to Professor
Wade, it should be included in the jury instructions.'2 '
Obviously, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has misunder-
stood the earlier analysis upon which it purports to rely. In suggesting
that courts refrain from instructing the jury on all seven factors in
every design case, Professor Wade did not propose that the jury be
precluded from engaging in cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, his
"reasonable manufacturer" substitute would seem to invite the jury
to consider whether the costs of the defendant's design choices ex-
ceeded their benefits.' 2 Stripped of the rhetoric, what the Pennsyl-
vania court seems to be saying in Azzarello is that while cost-benefit
analysis on a case-by-case basis is necessary and proper in product
design cases, a jury of laypersons cannot be trusted to perform that
analysis.
To the extent that the Azzarello decision assigns to the judge full
responsibility for this issue in cases given to the jury to decide, it
renders less meaningful the opportunity of the parties to have their
case heard by a jury. If cost-benefit analysis is an essential part of
the law of product design liability, and if judges may appropriately
118. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text. The Azzarello court relied
heavily on Professor Wade's article in its reasoning. See 391 A.2d at 1025-26 nn.8-10.
119. See Wade, supra note 7, at 840.
120. See id. at 839-40.
121. See id. at 840-41.
122. This is very much the same function as is served by the "reasonably prudent
person" instruction in negligence cases. See generally Henderson, Expanding the Neg-
ligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 478-79 (1976).
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employ that analysis to screen the sufficiency of plaintiff's averments
on a case-by-case basis, then juries should be allowed to participate
in that analysis in cases given to them to decide. Again, this writer
would urge that middle ground rules of greater specificity be devel-
oped to reduce direct dependence on the reasonableness concept; but
in close cases where cost-benefit analysis is unavoidable, if meaning-
ful trial by jury is to be afforded, the jury must participate in that
analysis.rs
On the other hand, if cost-benefit analysis is not properly a part
of the law governing the defective product design, it should be elimi-
nated altogether. Courts may properly refrain from giving unduly
complicated instructions likely to confuse jurors, but in close cases
given to them to decide, the jurors must apply rules of decision that
in substance are the same as those employed by the court., 4
Having concluded that the concept of unreasonableness should
not be used by juries in resolving the design defect issue, the court
in Azzarello proceeded to adopt a test for inclusion in jury instruc-
tions which, if taken literally, will radically change and hopelessly
confuse the law of product design liability in Pennsylvania. Relying
on language from one of its own recent decisions to the effect that a
manufacturer is a "guarantor of his product's safety,"n the court
concluded:
123. For an interesting comparison in the field of criminal law see United States
v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972). In Taylor, Judge Friendly overturned the
longstanding but much criticized "Second Circuit Rule" which had been laid down by
Judge Hand in United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 726 (1944). Under the "Second Circuit Rule" the judge, upon a criminal
defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, decided whether or not the
question should go to the jury using the same standard as in a civil case: whether
reasonable men could find a preponderance of evidence for the state. If the question
went to the jury, it applied the traditional "beyond a reasonable doubt standard." In
overturning this aberrational approach, Judge Friendly reasoned that the judge and
jury should apply the same standard. Id. at 242. Failure to apply the same standard
meant that in some cases, albeit very few, the jury was operating beyond its province.
The problem with the Azzarello court's holding is analogous but in reverse. Allow-
ing the judge to decide reasonableness, but not the jury, means that the jury will not
be able to operate to the full extent of its widely accepted province in the area of torts:
close findings of reasonableness. Close questions of unreasonable danger will be deter-
mined by the judge instead of the jury.
124. There are some phrases in tort law-for example, "res ipsa loquitur"-that
are employed by lawyers and courts in analyzing cases but are not included in jury
instructions. See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PRocass 365 (1975). But it
must be understood that res ipsa is a rule of evidence relating to the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's proof and not a substantive rule of decision. Once the court gives a res ipsa
case to the jury, the jury applies a negligence standard that is substantively the same
as that applied by the court.




For the term guarantor to have any meaning in this context the
supplier must at least provide a product which is designed to make
it safe for the intended use. -Under this standard, in this type case,
the jury may find a defect where the product left the supplier's
control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its in-
tended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the
intended use.'
Read literally, this definition constitutes a radical departure from the
growing consensus that cost-benefit analysis is the appropriate ana-
lytic method for determining the design defect issue in close cases.
The element that distinguishes this new test from the emerging con-
sensus, of course, is the apparently deliberate elimination of the mod-
ifier "reasonable" in connection with the adjective "safe." Taken
literally, this test condemns as defective any product design that
exposes its users to risks, regardless of whether those risks are justi-
fied in light of associated benefits.
Combining the several aspects of this unusual decision, a two-
step approach emerges: First, the trial judge must screen the ade-
quacy of the plaintiff's averments in the complaint, somehow em-
ploying a cost-benefit analysis to determine the unreasonableness of
the design-related risks as a matter of law. Then, assuming that the
case is appropriate for jury consideration, the court must instruct the
jury to decide the liability issue on the basis of whether the design
could possibly (rather than reasonably) have been made safer for its
intended use.'1 Viewed most charitably, such an approach to the
design defect issue is confused and unworkable. Viewed realistically,
the new test announced in Azzarello encourages juries to impose lia-
bility merely because plaintiffs have somehow been injured while
using defendant's products.
C. THE Schuldies DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in Schuldies v. Service Machinery Co. I2 vividly
reflects the confusion in Wisconsin case law on the subject of defec-
tive product design. The facts in Schuldies closely parallel those in
the two cases already considered. The plaintiff, a tool-and-diemaker,
was injured when he accidently stepped on the foot pedal of a punch
press, activating the machine and causing it to crush his hand.'29 The
plaintiff based his action on separate counts of negligence and strict
liability relating to the design of the foot pedal mechanism. At the
126. 391 A.2d at 1027 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1022.
128. 448 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
129. Id. at 1199.
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close of trial, the jury found that "the punch press with the foot
[pedal] was not 'in such defective condition as to be unreasonably
dangerous to a prospective user.""3 'Inexplicably, the jury also found
that the defendant manufacturer was "negligent in the manner in
which it designed, constructed, and equipped the punch press with
the foot switch."'' Insisting that the jury verdict was inconsistent
and not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, the defen-
dant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial. Applying dictum from a Wisconsin decision to the effect that
"there may be recovery for the negligent design of a product even
though it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A sense,"'32 the
district court denied the motions. 1 3 Even assuming the validity of the
defendant's position that there can be no recovery if the jury finds
the product safe for prospective users, the district court refused to
equate the jury's finding of "not. .. unreasonably dangerous" with
"safe.' 34 According to the district court, Wisconsin decisions re-
flected a concern that the plaintiff in an action for negligent design
not be required to prove special or extraordinary danger posed by the
design.'3 A plaintiff who establishes the defendant's negligence in
designing the product, therefore, may recover notwithstanding a jury
finding that the product design was not unreasonably dangerous.
Although it is understandable that a federal court would feel
bound to rely on oft-repeated dicta in state supreme court opinions,
there can be little doubt that the result reached in Schuldies is unac-
ceptable in principle. The essence of the negligence concept in a
product design case is the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm
by the defendant's choice of available design alternatives. 3' To speak
of a manufacturer behaving unreasonably in making such choices is
to speak of the manufacturer adopting a design that is unreasonably
dangerous. The concept of "choice" in this context is the bridge that
unites the unreasonably dangerous activity of the manufacturer with
the unreasonably dangerous result of that activity, the defective de-
sign.13 7 The growing consensus regarding the appropriateness of cost-
benefit analysis in determining defective product design recognizes
the essential unity between the analysis of the designer's unreasona-
ble choices and the-design's unreasonable risks. Assuming that the
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1200 (quoting Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603, 235 N.W.2d 677,
685 (1975) (Heffernan, J., concurring) See note 148 infra and accompanying text.
133. 448 F. Supp. at 1201.
134. Id. at 1200.
135. Id. at 1201.
136. See generally W. PRossER, supra note 97, at 644-46.
137. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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same meaning is given to the concept of unreasonableness under both
negligence and strict liability, 38 a designer cannot have been negli-
gent in designing a product- and at the same time have chosen a
design that is not unreasonably dangerous and therefore not defec-
tive.
This is not to say that negligence and defective design are neces-
sarily synonymous as used in the area of defective product design. As
was earlier observed, because a presumption of defendant's knowl-
edge of design-related risks is included in one widely-recognized test
for design defect,' 3 it is possible for a non-negligent designer to pro-
duce an unreasonably dangerous, and thus defective, design. It can-
not logically work the other way around, however; the designer can-
not have been negligent in his design choices unless the resulting
design poses an unreasonable risk of harm. Of course, a manufacturer
may have been negligent in marketing a product design, even though
that design, properly marketed, would not be unreasonably danger-
ous.'40 But the jury finding in Schuldies expressly limited the defen-
dant's negligence in that case to "the manner in which [the manufac-
turer] designed, constructed, and equipped the punch press with the
foot switch."''
How could the courts in Wisconsin have wandered into such a
morass regarding the relationship between negligence and strict lia-
bility in these product design cases? The confusion dates back more
than a decade to Dippel v. Sciano,'4 in which the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin equated strict liability with "negligence per se" as an ana-
lytical means of applying that state's comparative fault principle.'
Two branches of thought regarding the relevance of the unreasonably
dangerous concept in negligent design cases appear to have developed
from that decision. One branch, epitomized by the self-styled
"majority" opinion of Justice Hansen in Greiten v. LaDow,"'4 a deci-
138. Even those who urge the adoption of strict liability for defective design
recognize that the cost-benefit analysis is the same in both instances. See note 22 supra
and accompanying text. See also Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830
(Iowa 1978).
139. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TooRTs § 388 (1965). Failure to provide ade-
quate warnings may also cause the product to be defective for that reason. See id. §
402A, Comment j.
For an interesting recent decision rebonciling a "no defect, manufacturer negli-
gent" verdict on the basis of the manufacturer's failure to warn, see Bigham v. J.C.
Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 897 (Minn. 1978). See also Comment, 63 MINN. L. REv.
995 (1979) (discussing Bigham).
141. 448 F. Supp. at 1199.
142. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
143. Id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64-65.
144. 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975).
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sion upon which the district court in Schuldies relied,' insists that
the plaintiff in a negligence action must establish that the product
design was unreasonably dangerous.'48 The other branch, epitomized
by the "concurring" opinion of Justice Heffernan in Greiten,'47 insists
to the contrary. Although the district court in Schuldies accurately
points out that the so-called "concurrence" in Greiten was in fact the
majority opinion,4 8 it is nevertheless clear that the assertion of the
irrelevance of a finding of unreasonable danger was dictum in any
event; all of the justices in Greiten agreed that the plaintiff's proof
had failed regardless of the legal theory relied upon. Moreover, lan-
guage to the same effect contained in another recent case upon which
the district court in Schuldies relied was also clearly dictum., Thus,
although the federal district court judge in Schuldies was justified in
concluding that a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin would have resolved the issue in that case as he did, there
is reason to hope that the Wisconsin state courts will consider them-
selves free to rethink the question when it is next presented to them
for decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Within the past year, three potentially influential courts have
threatened to postpone, if not prevent, the emerging consensus sup-
porting cost-benefit analysis as the appropriate conceptual basis for
determining liability for defective product design. Basically, all three
decisions appear to recognize the substantive legitimacy of cost-
benefit analysis in design cases. They do so, however, in ways that
either needlessly confuse the decisionmaking process or assure that
it will be reduced to an essentially unprincipled, "jury's whim" ap-
proach to resolving the issue of defective design. The Supreme Court
of California, by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to show
that its design choices were reasonable, has seemingly assured that
plaintiffs will reach the jury in all but the most absurd design cases.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, by attempting to reserve cost-
benefit analysis as the exclusive province of the judiciary, has com-
mitted the courts of that commonwealth to a confusing and probably
unworkable approach to resolving the question of liability in these
cases. And a federal district court in Wisconsin, by taking the law of
145. See 448 F. Supp. at 1200.
146. 70 Wis. 2d 594-98, 235 N.W.2d at 681-93.
147. See 70 Wis. 2d at 599-604, 235 N.W.2d at 683-86.
148. 448 F. Supp. at 1200. This fact had been previously recoznized by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d
76, 80 (1976),
149. See Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976).
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that state the final step to severing all conceptual ties between negli-
gent design and strict liability, has embraced a pattern of results in
product design cases that can only be described as inconsistent and
nonsensical. The first two decisions are potentially more troublesome
than the third, and the first-the California decision purporting to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant-is unquestionably the
most problematic of all. None of the courts appear to have appre-
ciated the implications of their decisions.
In arguing in support of the growing consensus on the- issue of
defective product design, this writer trusts that he will not be misun-
derstood to imply that the process concerns expressed elsewhere'
have been totally or even subtantially assuaged by developments in
recent years. To the contrary, the gradual formulation of a consensus
favoring cost-benefit analysis has been accompanied in some jurisdic-
tions by a lamentable tendency of courts to routinely address prob-
lems beyond their inherent competence.' From the perspective of
150. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
151. No better example of this tendency may be found than the decision of the
Texas Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.
1978), a case already cited as part of the growing consensus favoring cost-benefit
analysis in product design cases. See note 10 supra. The plaintiff in that case, a front-
end loader operator, was severely injured when he slipped on the metal step leading
from the cab of the machine to the ground. The step was 22 inches off the ground and
was muddy due to the loader being operated under extremely wet conditions. The
plaintiff had used the step thousands of times before, under all conditions, and knew
that it was muddy on the day of the accident. Handholds were designed into the
machine to help minimize the risk of falling. The plaintiff argued in favor of a retracta-
ble ladder arrangement that would function somewhat like a drawbridge. The defen-
dant insisted that, while such an alternative had been used on some types of front-
end loaders, it had never been used on machines of the sort involved in that case, and
would be counterproductive for the type of work for which the machine in question was
specifically designed. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on a
negligence and defective design theory.
On appeal, the intermediate court reversed, holding insufficient the plaintiff's
proof of defective design. See Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Gonzales, 562 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Pointing to evidence that no similar injuries had been
reported in 15 years of use of the same design, and describing the plaintiff's suggested
alternatives as obvious "no contest items" from a balance of safety viewpoint, 562
S.W.2d at 579, the appellate court refused to participate in what it characterized as a
"jury-whim" approach to the issue of defective product design. Id. at 580. On appeal,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed again and remanded to the appellate court for
further proceedings concerning points not reached by that court. 571 S.W.2d at 872.
On the main issue raised on appeal, the high court held that there was evidence from
which the jury could conclude that the tractor in question was negligently designed.
Id. Reading the two opinions in this case side by side, it is submitted that the Texas
Supreme Court, in refusing to accept the intermediate court's analysis, missed an




substance rather than process, however, the conceptual basis for de-
termining liability for unreasonably dangerous design choices is, al-
most by definition, a cost-benefit analysis that weighs risk against
utility. Indeed, it was the appropriateness of that analysis as a matter
of substance that elsewhere prompted this writer to speculate that
the process difficulties being encountered were "inevitable."'' 52
The real irony associated with the three recent decisions ana-
lyzed in this Article is that they come at a time when the process
difficulties, though still substantial, may be diminishing. Putting
these decisions aside for a moment, at least two developments in
recent years offer hope that "middle ground" rules of decision will be
worked out that will reduce the polycentricity in design cases to man-
ageable levels: first, the growing tendency for courts in some jurisdic-
tions to direct verdicts for defendants in obviously meritless cases,
accompanied by tentative efforts to develop workable rules of deci-
sion;'5 and second, the prospect that legislatures may contribute,
hopefully in a responsible manner, to the rule development process. 5 1
Whatever may otherwise have been the chances that these devel-
opments. would have achieved significant reductions in the process
difficulties associated with the issue of defective product design, the
three decisions examined in this Article threaten to delay or prevent
that achievement. Presumably, legislatures are free to reverse the
impacts of these decisions; however, it is not clear that legislatures
in the affected states will move to correct the situation or whether,
in any event, legislative attempts at correction would pass judicial
152. See Henderson, supra note 122, at 485-86.
153. See, e.g., Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1979)
(directed verdict for manufacturer of commercial pressure cooker upheld because of
lack of adequate expert testimony; mere fact of explosion insufficient to support con-
clusion that design defective); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066
(4th Cir. 1974) (although recognizing auto manufacturer's duty to provide reasonable
passenger safety in "second collisions," court reversed trial court judgment for plaintiff
and remanded with instructions to direct verdict for manufacturer when plaintiff
attacked design of rear-engine microbus as "inherently dangerous"); Leonard v. Al-
bany Mach. & Supply Co., 339 So.2d 458 (La. App. 1976) (manufacturer of wood
trimmer component on saw mill not required to provide safety shield since shields
customarily provided by individual mills; multifunctional nature of product important
factor in determining defectiveness of design); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio
St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (power press not defective as matter of law notwith-
standing manufacturer's failure to incorporate fixed barrier guard, where applicable
safety code provided for either fixed barrier guard or two-hand tripping device and
machine was equipped with latter safety device).
154. See generally Henderson, The Gathering Momentum Toward Statutory
Reform, 1 CORP. L. Rlv. 41 (1978); Products Liability Symposium, 56 N.C. L. Rv.
623 (1978). The Department of Commerce has recently published the first draft of a
proposed Uniform Product Liability Law. See 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
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scrutiny under state constitutions.' 55 Therefore, it is important that
these recent departures from the growing consensus be rejected firmly
and unanimously. As explained above, it may still be possible for
courts in the jurisdictions directly involved to rethink the matter and
put things right. Whether or not that occurs, courts elsewhere should
take the first opportunity to disassociate themselves from these dis-
turbing developments.
155. Properly viewed, remedial legislation should encounter no difficulties, but
the possibility cannot be overlooked. For a recent analysis of the somewhat analogous
situation in the field of medical malpractice reform, see Redish, Legislative Response
to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L.
REv. 759 (1977). Professor Redish catalogs various state efforts to create legislative
guidelines in the medical malpractice field-including ceilings on damages, shortened
statutes of limitation*, pretrial screening panels, and arbitration of claims-and dis-
cusses the constitutional obstacles that have stood in the way of their enactment.
These legislative efforts have come under equal protection and substantive due process
attack. See id. at 769-90. They have also been assailed as diluting the right to a jury
trial, violating the constitutional separation of powers, and depriving access to the
courts. See id. at 790-800.
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